Beyond Binaries: Contesting Pluralisms in Turkish Politics

On 17 June 2025, SEESOX closed its term with a seminar chaired by Othon Anastasakis. The event featured Associate Professor Nora Fisher-Onar, Chair of Global Studies at the University of San Francisco, who introduced her new book on Turkey’s “plural realities” and argued that conventional binary frames—East versus West, secular versus religious—obscure more than they explain.

Fisher-Onar began by explaining how conventional “either/or” frames—East versus West, secularist versus religious—distort our understanding of Turkey. She showed how cover images from The Economist, The Guardian and Der Spiegel rely on binary tropes (a bridge between continents, a covered versus an uncovered woman), whereas her book’s quilted-textile cover from Antalya’s open-air markets captures Turkey’s kaleidoscopic diversity. Those hard binaries, she argued, simplify causal complexity in political science, misguide policy towards Muslim-majority states (by backing whichever authoritarian model seems “our ally”) and fuel Islamophobia and right-wing populism at home.

Laying out her three-part structure—Theory, History and Twenty-First Century—Fisher-Onar described Chapter 1’s survey of three waves of Turkish pluralist thought: early Republican social engineering, mid-century democratisation that welcomed diverse societal energies, and a third wave of area-studies scholars crafting truly comparative approaches. In Chapter 2 she offered a new “complex-systems” key to politics, treating Turkey as a system defined by interacting parameters—ideas (normative repertoires), actors (strategic performers) and structures (from electoral laws to global power balances). Rather than isolating single causes, this lens traces how emergent coalitions—shifting alliances of pluralists and anti-pluralists—drive critical junctures.

From Anti-Americanism to Americanofilia: The United States in the kaleidoscope of Greek society

On 3 June 2025, SEESOX hosted an illuminating symposium entitled “From Anti-Americanism to Americanofilia: The United States in the Kaleidoscope of Greek Society.” Over the course of the afternoon, Lamprini Rori, Assistant Professor of Political Analysis at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, and Eirini Karamouzi, Associate Professor of Contemporary History and International Relations at the American College of Greece, presented preliminary findings from their joint research project. Their remarks were followed by commentary from Paul Betts (St Antony’s College, Oxford) and Dimitris Papadimitriou (University of Manchester). Together, they charted fifty years of Greek attitudes towards the United States, weaving together party politics, public opinion, media analysis and the performative rituals of state visits.

Dr Rori commenced with a mass-level perspective, demonstrating that Greek public opinion—drawn from Eurobarometer, MRP and national surveys—remained net negative towards the United States throughout the 1980s and 1990s, only tipping into mildly favourable territory in 2022. She highlighted a striking pattern of elite–mass convergence and divergence: in the 1980s both voters and party elites shared similarly anti-American sentiments; in the 1990s, elites became noticeably more pro-American than the electorate; in the 2000s, the public adopted scepticism aligned with the left-wing parties; and in the 2010s, citizens moderated their stance more rapidly than party leadership. Until the mid-1990s, ideological self-placement and party vote were strong predictors of attitudes to the US; after the financial crash, however, these factors lost explanatory power, leaving only pro-European orientation and attitudes towards Russia as significant correlates.

Europe and the Black Sea regional (in)security A story of Mutual Creation?

On 13 May 2025, SEESOX convened a seminar on Black Sea security and regional order. The event was chaired by Othon Anastasakis. The panel comprised Galip Dalay, Coordinator of the SEESOX Contemporary Programme, and Senior Consulting Fellow and Turkey expert at Chatham House; Natalie Sabanadze, Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House; Nigel Gould-Davies, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Keir Giles, Senior Consulting Fellow at Chatham House; and Ian Lesser, Distinguished Fellow and Adviser to the President at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, who joined online. Together they assessed how Russia’s assertive policies, NATO’s evolving posture, and Turkey’s strategic balancing act are reshaping the security and normative landscape of the Black Sea basin.

Galip Dalay began by warning that Western focus on Ukraine has obscured the wider region’s agency. He argued that the Cold War–style emphasis on great-power projection—exemplified by Russia’s attempts to exclude other actors from the Black Sea—undermines the principle of regional ownership that underpins sustainable order. Moscow’s two decades of naval expansion and its denial of littoral states’ agency have in fact provoked complementary trends: a drive towards deeper European political and economic integration among coastal states, and renewed interest in small-scale cooperation projects, such as trilateral initiatives between Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. For Dalay, Ukraine must remain a Black Sea power if it is to prevent a Russian monopoly; without Ukrainian naval capability, he cautioned, Russia will effectively transform the basin into its own “inland sea” and project influence into the global South via grain diplomacy and normative agendas.

The second Trump Administration: Implications for South East Europe

On 12 March, 2025, SEESOX hosted a seminar exploring the potential trajectory of U.S. foreign policy under a second Trump administration, with a particular focus on Europe, the Western Balkans, and Turkey. The panel featured Joan Hoey, Editor of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s flagship annual Democracy Index; Oana Lungescu, the longest-serving NATO Spokesperson and Romanian journalist; and Daniel Dombey, Executive News Editor at the Financial Times. The discussion was chaired by Othon Anastasakis.

Joan Hoey opened the seminar by characterising Donald Trump’s primary focus as domestic reconstruction rather than foreign affairs. According to Hoey, Trump’s overarching objective is to consolidate domestic governance and authority, rather than to seek international legitimacy through foreign policy exploits. Nonetheless, this inward focus will inevitably shape his approach abroad—particularly his determination to curtail overseas commitments that deplete U.S. resources.

Hoey emphasised that Trump is serious about negotiating an end to conflicts such as the Russo-Ukrainian War, aiming to prevent further crises that could entangle the United States. In regions like the Balkans, the administration would likely move away from the political engineering efforts seen under President Biden, instead prioritising stability and the containment of Russian and Chinese influence.

Although the Balkans may not initially be a high priority, Hoey suggested they could re-emerge on Washington’s agenda, especially given factors such as Trump Jr.’s business interests in Serbia and wider Eastern Europe, and Elon Musk’s engagement with Romania’s elections. Bilateral relations would likely be elevated, but through a transactional lens—Balkan leaders would be expected to align with U.S. preferences in areas such as energy and defence procurement.

Montenegro: Next EU's member state?

“Partnership with the EU is more important today than ever, especially in light of geopolitical challenges”

President of Montenegro Jakov Milatović held a lecture at the European Studies Centre, St Antony's College at the prestigious University of Oxford, where he discussed with professors and students about Montenegro’s European future. The President emphasized that “the future of Montenegro and the Western Balkans is in an integrated Europe, based on common values ​​and interests, and emphasized that Montenegro’s membership in the EU is not just a technical process, but an opportunity to improve the quality of life of all our citizens by strengthening the rule of law, building an efficient public administration, achieving economic progress, ensuring equal opportunities for all and establishing zero tolerance for corruption.

“When I took office as President, I set an ambitious but achievable goal – for Montenegro to become the 28th member of the European Union by 2028. If you believe in what you are doing and work hard for that goal, it will be achieved,” said President Milatović. He recalled Montenegro’s strengths and its commitment to European values, the country is fully aligned with the EU’s foreign policy, uses the euro as its currency and is actively implementing reforms in the area of ​​the rule of law.

Europe and Middle Powers: EU's relations with India, Brazil and Turkey

The seminar, held on 18 February 2025, brought together experts to discuss how non-European actors and the “middle powers” – India, Brazil, and Turkey – fit into the evolving new global order. Chaired by Dimitar Bechev, Director of the Dahrendorf Programme at the European Studies Centre, the panel featured Kira Huju, Fellow in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes, Researcher on Public Policies and International Relations at the Department of International Development at Oxford, and Galip Dalay, SEESOX.

The discussion began with a reflection on the importance of moving away from a Eurocentric viewpoint. The speakers examined how historical legacies, power dynamics, and past relationships continue to shape the role of non-European countries in global affairs. There was a strong emphasis on understanding how different regions engage with global institutions and major powers while also navigating their own internal political landscapes.

Huju, a former Oxford student and an expert on India, highlighted two key signals in the evolving relationship between the European Union and India. The first was the EU’s increasing eagerness to deepen ties with India, reflecting a shift in strategic priorities. The second was an implicit acknowledgment that the EU has significantly underperformed in its engagement with India, leaving much of the relationship’s potential unexplored. While the EU aspires to establish itself as a geopolitical player in the Indo-Pacific, this effort is largely confined to individual member states, such as France, which has prioritised defence cooperation with India. However, these national efforts do not necessarily translate into a coherent EU-wide approach.

The new European Parliament and European Commission: Who won the 2024 power-play in Brussels?

On February 11, 2025, SEESOX, together with the European Studies Centre, hosted an insightful seminar featuring Klaus Welle, former Secretary General of the European Parliament, and Anthony Teasdale, visiting professor in Practice at the European Institute of the London School of Economics. The event, chaired by Catherine Briddick, Andrew W Mellon Associate Professor of International Human Rights and Refugee Law at St Antony’s College, Oxford, focused on the shifting power dynamics in Brussels following the 2024 European elections, highlighting governance challenges, parliamentary realignments, and the future direction of European integration.

Klaus Welle opened the discussion by emphasising the unique structure of the European Parliament. Unlike national systems where power is fused within a parliamentary majority, the European Union (EU) operates through a diffusion of power. This federal-style system ensures that no single party dominates; instead, the EU is governed by a complex web of institutions—the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council—where alliances are essential to achieving legislative goals.

A key takeaway from Welle’s remarks was the changing composition of the European Parliament. The 2024 elections resulted in a divided assembly, with one-third of members aligned with left-wing parties, a strong centrist faction, and a growing presence of right-wing representatives. The steady rise of right-wing populist parties across member states, such as Le Pen’s National Rally in France and the Alternative for Germany (AfD), mirrors the broader European political landscape. Notably, the so-called “progressive majority” that had characterised the previous Parliament has now disappeared, with left-leaning parties falling below the 45% threshold necessary to form a stable coalition.