Europe and Middle Powers: EU's relations with India, Brazil and Turkey

The seminar, held on 18 February 2025, brought together experts to discuss how non-European actors and the “middle powers” – India, Brazil, and Turkey – fit into the evolving new global order. Chaired by Dimitar Bechev, Director of the Dahrendorf Programme at the European Studies Centre, the panel featured Kira Huju, Fellow in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes, Researcher on Public Policies and International Relations at the Department of International Development at Oxford, and Galip Dalay, SEESOX.

The discussion began with a reflection on the importance of moving away from a Eurocentric viewpoint. The speakers examined how historical legacies, power dynamics, and past relationships continue to shape the role of non-European countries in global affairs. There was a strong emphasis on understanding how different regions engage with global institutions and major powers while also navigating their own internal political landscapes.

Huju, a former Oxford student and an expert on India, highlighted two key signals in the evolving relationship between the European Union and India. The first was the EU’s increasing eagerness to deepen ties with India, reflecting a shift in strategic priorities. The second was an implicit acknowledgment that the EU has significantly underperformed in its engagement with India, leaving much of the relationship’s potential unexplored. While the EU aspires to establish itself as a geopolitical player in the Indo-Pacific, this effort is largely confined to individual member states, such as France, which has prioritised defence cooperation with India. However, these national efforts do not necessarily translate into a coherent EU-wide approach.

Huju described the idea of a “modern partnership” between India and the EU as a euphemism for a recalibrated relationship. Unlike in the past, when the EU often adopted a condescending stance towards post-colonial states, there is now a growing recognition of India’s global stature. While economic considerations are a major driver of this engagement, China remains a critical factor. The EU-India partnership functions, in part, as a hedge against China, though there is no unified strategy for managing this dynamic. Unlike the EU, India does not seek to contain China outright, instead opting for a more calibrated approach. The geopolitical landscape is further shaped by the possibility of another Trump presidency in the United States, raising questions about how India might maximise strategic alignment while maintaining its multi-alignment strategy. The key to a successful partnership, Huju argued, is mutual respect, particularly in recognising India’s power status—something it has not always received from Europe.

Moraes provided an analysis of Brazil’s foreign policy, particularly in relation to the United States and Europe. He noted that Brazil’s political future remains uncertain, with the next election set to determine whether the country continues its current path of social democracy or shifts towards neofascism. In foreign policy, the dominant approach remains what he termed “Amorinismo,” named after Celso Amorim, which prioritises South-South relations as a means of promoting multipolarity. However, there remains a gap between rhetoric and practice, as Brazil continues to position itself as a leader without necessarily having a strong base of followers.

Moraes suggested that Brazil will likely seek to avoid direct confrontation with the United States, particularly under another Trump administration. Rather than taking a leadership role in an anti-Trump coalition, Brazil is expected to maintain a low profile and avoid drawing attention from Washington. In its relations with Europe, Brazil enjoys a relative advantage, as economic engagement with the EU is far less divisive in domestic politics than engagement with either the US or China. The EU is perceived as a non-hegemonic partner, whereas relations with China remain a source of internal debate, even within Brazil’s leftist political circles. The high level of foreign direct investment from Europe further reinforces this perception.

Moraes also examined the divisive nature of the EU-Mercosur agreement, a contentious issue in Brazil’s domestic politics. His research into Brazilian President Lula’s tweets revealed how foreign policy issues feature in his public messaging. Approximately 25% of Lula’s tweets address foreign policy, with varying degrees of positive, neutral, or negative framing. His messaging on relations with the US, for example, is heavily focused on economic matters, particularly labour rights, reflecting the deep economic interconnections between the two countries. Moraes noted that while Lula’s rhetoric on global governance reform has been strong, actual policy implementation remains limited due to a lack of resources and political risk aversion.

Dalay offered a Turkish perspective on the shifting global order, arguing that the most significant changes stem not from individual leaders like Trump, but from broader geopolitical transformations in Turkey’s neighbourhood, particularly Syria and Ukraine. He described Turkey’s evolving approach to conflict management, noting a shift since 2015-2016 towards reducing Western influence in its regional dealings. This has been particularly evident in Syria, where territorial changes have required constant adaptation.

Dalay discussed the strategic relationships between Turkey, Russia, and Iran, arguing that while their interests do not always align, they have adopted a transactional approach to conflict management. This approach fosters dialogue and pragmatic engagement. He also highlighted how Turkey’s partnerships have become more flexible and goal-oriented rather than institutionally rigid, reflecting a broader decline in Western-centric international structures.

One of Dalay’s key arguments was that the idea of the West as the singular centre of global power is fading. Historically, Turkey’s geopolitical identity was shaped by its aspiration to align with the West, both politically and normatively. However, the declining centrality of the West offers Turkey greater leverage in engaging with multiple power centres. Dalay suggested that Trump’s return to power would accelerate this process, making it increasingly difficult to talk about “the West” as a single, cohesive entity. He described this as a regime-level shift rather than an administration-level change, with long-term consequences for multilateralism and the global balance of power.

The seminar concluded with a discussion on broader themes of global governance, multilateralism, and the changing nature of international alliances. The speakers debated whether institutions such as the IMF and World Bank need reform to reflect contemporary geopolitical realities while addressing the challenges of reconciling efficiency and legitimacy in global governance structures. The conversation also touched on the growing importance of middle powers and their role in shaping a world order that is no longer solely defined by Western dominance.

A particularly thought-provoking question revolved around the definition of the Global South. Dalay questioned whether China, despite its economic power, still belongs to this category. He suggested that the rise of middle-power alliances requires a more nuanced understanding of the Global South, which cannot be treated as a monolithic entity. Moraes echoed this sentiment, noting that Brazil has historically played with both the idea of the Global South as a residual category and as a political community that has experienced Western exploitation. Huju added that India’s position is somewhat paradoxical—it is both a rising power seeking recognition, as evidenced by its push for a permanent UN Security Council seat, and a developing country that benefits from its status within the Global South.

The seminar offered valuable insights into how non-European actors perceive and navigate the evolving global order. While the decline of Western dominance presents challenges, it also creates opportunities for countries like India, Brazil, and Turkey to assert their agency in international affairs. As the world moves towards a more multipolar structure, the nature of partnerships and alliances will continue to shift, making dialogue and mutual understanding all the more critical.

 by Yangyang Zhao (ESC Research Assistant)