Galip Dalay began by warning that Western focus on Ukraine has obscured the wider region’s agency. He argued that the Cold War–style emphasis on great-power projection—exemplified by Russia’s attempts to exclude other actors from the Black Sea—undermines the principle of regional ownership that underpins sustainable order. Moscow’s two decades of naval expansion and its denial of littoral states’ agency have in fact provoked complementary trends: a drive towards deeper European political and economic integration among coastal states, and renewed interest in small-scale cooperation projects, such as trilateral initiatives between Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. For Dalay, Ukraine must remain a Black Sea power if it is to prevent a Russian monopoly; without Ukrainian naval capability, he cautioned, Russia will effectively transform the basin into its own “inland sea” and project influence into the global South via grain diplomacy and normative agendas.Natalie Sabanadze built on this by identifying three constants that define the Black Sea order: Russia’s unbounded sense of entitlement to dominate the region; the “Bloodiest Water” constellation of contested sovereignty and securitised connectivity; and a fragmentation of littoral states’ perceptions of threat and opportunity. She traced how Russia’s hybrid campaigns—economic embargoes, manipulation of corruption networks and information operations—have deepened political fault-lines in Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia. Romania, she noted, alone consistently urges Brussels to take firmer action, whereas Bulgaria’s ruling elites remain unconcerned by Russian influence. Sabanadze argued that these divergent outlooks have stymied a coherent regional strategy, even as the conflict in Ukraine has both heightened the Black Sea’s strategic importance and accelerated its “Europeanisation” as security debates migrate into NATO and EU forums.
Keir Giles then turned to the region’s military dynamics. He emphasised that any lasting security architecture must reckon with Russia’s well-entrenched missile and naval capabilities along Ukraine’s coastline—and the prospect that a partial or temporary ceasefire could embolden Moscow to consolidate its gains. Giles warned that Turkey’s willingness to broker or enforce a ceasefire will hinge on Ankara’s own threat perceptions, including how Russia uses Crimea as a launchpad for projecting power into south-western Europe. He further assessed Western contributions: the UK’s stretched naval forces and political limitations, and the US military’s aimlessness in Europe, where some NATO installations have become “zombie” postings lacking clear mission directives. For Giles, only a credible demonstration of allied resolve—through both force posture and political will—can deter further Russian expansion.
Nigel Gould-Davies questioned whether the conventional East–West framework adequately captures the Black Sea’s evolving reality. He drew an analogy to Central Europe after 1989, arguing that the basin now demands its own conceptual architecture, one that accounts for Turkey’s complex, often contradictory ties to both Moscow and Kyiv. He urged analysts to treat Ukraine not as a passive “object” of great-power struggle but as an active “subject” shaping the regional order—just as Romania’s polarised electorate and Turkey’s balancing diplomacy testify to indigenous agency.
Finally, Ian Lesser assessed Washington’s fractured approach to the Black Sea, noting parallels with US naval posture in the Mediterranean. He observed that despite Turkey’s pivotal role as both facilitator and constraint—hosting missile-defence assets even as it maintains strategic ties to Russia—there remains no overarching US Black Sea strategy. Lesser argued that forthcoming talks between Putin and Zelenskiy, due to take place in Turkey, will underscore Ankara’s indispensable position; yet the outcome will depend on whether a new US administration pursues transactional diplomacy or reasserts traditional collective-security commitments.
During the Q&A, panellists tackled Romania–Ukraine relations, Turkey’s hedging strategies, and the Trump administration’s potential impact. Sabanadze reflected on growing anxieties in Bucharest over Moldova’s stability and the influence of pro-Russian, anti-establishment parties. Giles cautioned that unpredictable US leadership could distort European defence planning, while Dalay stressed that Turkey’s historical pattern—cooperating with Russia when both are excluded by the West, competing when allied—remains a potent driver of regional dynamics. On Europe’s role, panellists debated whether Kyiv would be better served within or outside EU structures, ultimately agreeing that deeper integration offers critical resilience against Russian coercion.
In conclusion, the discussion underscored that Black Sea security is neither confined to Ukraine nor reducible to great-power rivalry. Instead, it is a multifaceted arena where regional ownership, normative contestation and shifting alliances intersect. As the EU, NATO and allied capitals recalibrate their strategies, they must engage not only with Russia’s ambitions but also with the diverse aspirations of Black Sea states—each of which plays a decisive role in shaping the basin’s future.
by Yangyang Zhao (ESC Research Assistant)
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