Greece and EEC membership: Was it a mistake?

Andrew Heinrich (D.Phil Candidate, St Hilda's College, Oxford)

 

 On 24 February, Eirini Karamouzi addressed SEESOX on “Greece and EEC membership: Was it a mistake?” The talk was chaired by Margaret MacMillan (Nuffield) and Anne Deighton (Wolfson) served as a discussant.

The financial and economic crises that gripped Greece in 2010 set in motion a domino effect that upset the stability of the euro and rattled the Eurozone markets. It also, perhaps inevitably at times of such widespread uncertainty, opened the floodgates to a seemingly endless blame game over the economic, financial and above all, political origins of the crisis. As the Greek financial woes polarised opinion and accelerated the emergence of clear divisions between northern and southern members of the European Union, former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, remembered among other things for the instrumental role he played in welcoming Greece to the European Economic Community in 1981, dived into the fray to admit that supporting Greek membership had been a mistake. Possibly the most high-profile actor to make a direct link between today’s crisis and Greece’s entry into the Community over three decades ago, Giscard helped to renew interest in the history of Greece and European integration. This heighten interest from the public now calls for a deeper understanding of Greece’s relationship with Europe that must go beyond short-termist, ahistorical analyses. It is the historian’s role to step back from conventional readings of the past and what Mark Gilbert has called a teleological approach to the writing of European integration and reconstruct the enlargement talks by showing how multiple choices and alternative paths existed at all times, regardless of the verdict one might wish to give on the integration of Greece into the EEC. Enlargement was part of a wider trend of economic, political, institutional and social transformation in the 1970s and was, as such, a reflection of the broad systemic changes that marked the decade as an era of transition.

The influence of Islamic fundamentalism and new security challenges

Andrew Heinrich (D.Phil Candidate, St Hilda's College, Oxford)

Dr. Kerem Öktem addressed SEESOX on 18 February on Religion and Radicalization in the Balkans and Beyond. Faisal Ahmed of Nuffield College chaired.

Dr. Öktem began by posing the question of whether there is justification to focus on “Jihadism in the Balkans” after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo. He defined Jihadism as a combination of Wahhabism, a conservative Sunni movement, and Takfirism, the act of one Muslim accusing another Muslim of blasphemy. It is out of a combination of these two movements that radicialization is born, according to Dr. Öktem.

He then continued to define three waves of international Jihad. The first wave started with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The second was when these ideologies took hold in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq, and the third became individual acts of terror throughout the world, including Europe. While none of these movements has ever succeeded in replacing mainstream Muslim beliefs, Jihadist attacks on civilians have become a defining nature of the outside world’s perception of Islam.

Diasporas in times of crisis: Agents of change?

Andrew Heinrich (D.Phil Candidate, St Hilda's College, Oxford)

On 11 February, Robin Cohen of the Oxford Diaspora Programme, Sarah Garding from Nuffield, and Antonis Kamaras from ELIAMEP addressed SEESOX on “Diasporas in times of crisis: agents of change?” Othon Anastasakis served as the chair.

Cohen began by elaborating on the multiple definitions of Diaspora as they began and have changed over time. Each definition, he argued, offers different pros and cons for understanding diasporas and their contributions to their homestates. The first and most extensive use of the term refers to populations dispersed by conflict or violence, such as the Jewish and Armenian Diasporas. From there, the term came to include those who migrated for economic reasons.

There has been a growing distinction between diasporas and refugees that needs to be addressed: what is the difference between the two? Is it a matter of collective conscious developed over time, as is clearly the case, for example, with the Zionist movement amongst certain components of the Jewish Diaspora? In short, more work must be done to distinguish- or merge- the definitions of diasporas and refugees, particularly if a distinction is to be made based on their respective roles as collective actors in the international system.

Russia: A partner and ally, or a Cold War competitor?

David Madden (SEESOX Associate, Senior Member, St Antony's College, Oxford)

Dr Dimitar Bechev spoke at SEESOX on 4 March on Russia and the Balkans in the seminar series Global South East Europe. Roy Allison of St Antony’s chaired.

He started by providing a snapshot of some recent developments: the triumphalist visit by Putin to Belgrade in October 2014 on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the city; statements by the new Syriza government in Greece apparently opposing sanctions against Russia; Russian naval visits to Cyprus; and the announcement of “Turkish Stream”, tying Russia and Turkey closer together on energy issues. At the same time there was a harder line coming out of Western European capitals in response to what appeared a challenge from Russia in the region.

Dr Bechev suggested that Russia did not have a special policy towards the Balkans: what happened there was a consequence of Russia’s overall relationship with the West. He divided the post-Soviet period into three phases. Under Andrei Kozyrev as foreign minister (1991-96), there was an opening to the West. Russia supported efforts to resolve West Balkan conflicts. Russia was sympathetic towards Serbia, but not excessively so: Milosevic had blotted his copy book by hedging his bets during the 1991 putsch attempt. With Yevgeny Primakov and Igor Ivanov there was a harder line. But the game was still more about Russia’s global role than about the West Balkans per se: and the stand-off at Pristina Airport lead to a climb-down, and strengthened the case for Bulgaria and Romania to join NATO.

The Power of the People: The dynamics and limits of social mobilization in South Eastern Europe

Jessie Hronesova (D.Phil Candidate, St Antony's College, Oxford)

In 2013 and 2014 a wave of protests swept across South Eastern Europe (SEE) and Turkey, taking many by surprise. These events had been long in the making, nourished by similar grievances and disenchantments, though they were triggered by different immediate causes. Despite the fact that not enough time has passed to evaluate their consequences and legacy, an interdisciplinary symposium was put together by Oxford and London-based students to ponder over the lessons from these protests and put forward some tentative propositions about their consequences.

The symposium, organized on the 27th February 2015 at St Antony’s and St John’s College, brought together over 40 students and researchers from all over Europe (especially South Eastern Europe) with different disciplinary backgrounds and methodological approaches to the study of social mobilization. From media analyses of the Gezi protests in Turkey to visual representations of previous protest in Serbia in the 1990s, the day-long event examined the various practical, theoretical, and normative aspects of active citizenship and protests. The comparative nature of this symposium showed that the Balkans cannot be singled out as a worn-torn European periphery but is part of a much wider phenomenon.

Jews, Communists and Germans: Greece's handling of its post-war legacies

David Madden (SEESOX Associate, Senior Member, St Antony's College, Oxford)

On 4 March, Kateřina Králová (Charles University, Prague) spoke on the theme “Jews, Communists and Germans: Greece's handling of its post-war legacies". Renee Hirschon chaired.

Deportation of the Jews in Thessaloniki by the German occupiers, July 1942

She began by pointing out that this is recently a hot issue in the current political climate in Greece and in Germany. She then described the German Occupation 1941-44. This was a triple occupation by Axis powers: Italy held most of continental Greece plus a part of Crete, Bulgaria Thrace, and Germany the strategic areas – notably on the borders with Turkey and Macedonia, most of Crete, and the northern Aegean islands. Later Germany took over the Italian zone. Germany carried out a deliberate policy of terror. From the summer of 1942 there was organised persecution of the Jews. Thessaloniki, formerly called the "Jerusalem of the Balkans", saw the annihilation of nearly its entire Jewish population. Bulgaria carried out a parallel policy in its occupation zone. There was also economic exploitation: including through an occupation loan from the Greek state and massive exportation of agricultural products, which resulted in hyperinflation and the great famine, with around 250,000 deaths especially in winter 1941-42. “Greece suffered perhaps more than any other country from Nazi occupation." (American Joint Distribution Committee, 1947).

Migration to South East Europe: Transit or final destination?

Jonathan Scheele (SEESOX Associate; Senior Member, St Antony's College, Oxford)

Week 6 in the “Global South East Europe” seminar series looked at what was happening in the region in terms of migration. Is it an origin for migration into the EU? A destination for migrants from outside Europe? Or a transit route into the rest of Europe?

A panel of three speakers looked at different aspects: Franck Duvell, from the Oxford Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) spoke on “Shifts in the Regional Order, New Patterns of Mobility and Migration Transitions in Europe – the Case of Turkey”; Eugenia Markova, from London Metropolitan University, on “Bulgaria’s Immigration Experiences”; and Dragos Tudorache, of DG HOME in the European Commission, on “The View from Brussels”.

Franck Duvell highlighted the data and the factors – political, economic and social –leading to his conclusion that the EU has ceased to be the only migration destination region; Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkey, as well as the Gulf States and Israel are also migrant destinations. Emigration from, and transit migration through, Turkey has diminished significantly and it has now become an immigrant destination, with consequent legal and institutional adjustments. It currently hosts 1.4 to 2.3 million regular and irregular immigrants plus some 1.7 million refugees from Syria. It is thus right, in his view, to talk of shifts in the global and regional migration order. While the EU may remain migrants’ first choice, they also have others; “we settle in Istanbul, even if we dream of Europe”. While this diverts immigration pressure away from the EU, it also creates competition for qualified migrants. As an example, Turkey is now aiming to recruit medical staff from Greece. Overall, from a situation where everything flows into the EU, we now have one where there is an emerging belt of countries with relatively liberal visa regimes surrounding the EU to the South and East which also receives migrants and refugees.