Cyprus and the energy developments in the Eastern Mediterranean

Androulla Kaminara

 

On the 17th of May we had a very interesting seminar on the hydrocarbon discoveries in the East Mediterranean, this time from the Cypriot perspective. This was the second such event at St Antony’s this term on the issue[1]. The main presenter was Dr Charles Ellinas, the Chairman of the Cyprus National Hydrocarbon Company, the discussant was Anastasios Giamouridis from Poyry who recently wrote a paper on the monetisation prospects and challenges of these deposits[2] and Androulla Kaminara EU Fellow was the organiser and the Chair.

The presentation of Charles Ellinas focused on three main issues:

1.      The technical aspects and the developments so far and the estimated natural gas discoveries;

2.      Cooperation prospects with Turkey, Israel and Lebanon;

3.      Future milestones for Cyprus.

1.   The technical aspects and the developments so far and the estimated natural gas discoveries

• American owned Noble Energy has already discovered about 7 tcf recoverable gas reserves in Cyprus’ EEZ in the Aphrodite field and will be carrying out appraisal drilling in June 2013. Noble has strong indications through the evaluation of their 3D survey data that there is another gas field in Block 12, possibly of the order of about 3-5 tcf.

·         The next key stages in the development of the Aphrodite gas field are as follows:

• Pre-Feed (Preliminary Front End Engineering Design – PRE-FEED): This is in progress and will be completed by Q2 2013.
• Appraisal drilling will take place during the summer of 2013, and by Q4 we should be able to confirm gas volumes and commerciality in 2014, taking into account export and project execution options.
• Cyprus expects to complete FEED by Q1 2015 and LNG sales agreements before the middle of 2015. The bidding process and selection of the EPC contractor and project finance should be completed by Q3 2015.
• The Final Investment Decision (FID) is targeted to be taken by the end of 2015.
• They expect to start construction of the offshore facilities, subsea pipeline and the LNG Plant at Vasiliko early in 2016. This is achievable if all preparation is carried out as planned and will provide good employment opportunities for Cypriots.
• Delivery of natural gas for the local market is expected by the end of 2018/early 2019. This will help the economy since currently the cost of electricity on the island is five times more expensive than the cost of electricity in the UK and this puts a huge burden on the cost of businesses and households.
• By the end of 2019/early 2020 the LNG Plant is expected to be operational, starting LNG exports to Europe and other parts of the world.

·         Cyprus has so far leased 6 Blocks and progress is as follows (see map):

• Italian ENI with Korean KOGAS has Blocks 2, 3 and 9 and are about to start their survey program, with exploration drilling scheduled early 2015.
• French owned TOTAL has Blocks 10 and 11, with potential both for oil and gas, and are also about to start their survey program, with exploration drilling scheduled earlier, in 2014.

  

 

These two consortia have committed to very aggressive survey and exploration programs that over the next 2-3 years will cost of the order of US$2 billion dollars. This substantial investment confirms their confidence for success.

All indications are that Block 9 holds substantially more gas resources than Block 12. Based on the above it is estimated that all 6 leased Blocks potentially hold 40 tcf of natural gas. This in turn is a good indication that indeed the Levantine Basin has 122 tcf and the Cyprus EEZ 60 tcf of gas, as suggested by USGS (USA Geological Survey)

2. Cooperation prospects with Turkey, Israel and Lebanon

Israel has a  proven and  probable gas reserves (Tamar) – 10 tcf,  proven gas resources (Leviathan) – 19 tcf as well as small gas fields and prospective gas resources (undrilled prospects) – 15 tcf. There has been a lot of very high level contacts between the two countries recently including a visit by President Anastasiadis to Israel earlier on in the month and prospects for closer cooperation are very good.

Lebanon is in the process of going for its first licensing round, and it estimated to have at least 25 tcf and there is a lot of interest already from perspective bidders. Lebanon has also shown interest for cooperation with Cyprus.

To pipeline or not to pipeline – that is the question?

• Technical considerations provide serious arguments against the pipeline option: Cyprus is talking about gas exports that could reach 35-50 bcm per year. Due to water depth (2000m) there is a limit in the diameter of subsea pipelines that can be installed. As a result 5 to 6 pipelines might be needed to export such volumes of gas. Such a solution would be neither practical nor economic.

• Legal complexities: 
  Pursuant to Art. 58 and Art. 79 of UNCLOS[3] all states are entitled to lay submarine pipelines on Costal States and EEZ. Although according to subparagraphs 79(2) and (3) require that: “Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from pipelines, the Coastal State may not impede the laying or maintenance of such pipelines.” It is also stated “The delineation of the course for the laying of such pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State.”

The geography of the area and the legal implications therefore mean that even if Israel wanted to build a pipeline to Turkey – it will need the consent of the transit states – i.e. Syria, Lebanon or Cyprus. In the current political context this consent will be very difficult to achieve.

Additional legal limitations arise wrt transit via pipelines through EEZ under Energy Charter Treaty (Cyprus, Greece and Turkey are parties to it).

According to Ellinas, the answer to pipeline or not to pipeline can only be not to pipeline and to build an LNG Plant at Vasiliko is the only logical but also economical solution for Cyprus.

The decision by Cyprus’ Ministerial Council in 2012 to establish an LNG Plant at Vasiliko, reconfirmed by the President in April 2013, was vital as it makes it possible to access world markets not just in Europe but also the Far East, thus contributing to the security of sales and stability of prices in the longer term.

  

With the timely establishment of the LNG Plant, Israel and Lebanon should also be able to bring their gas to Cyprus for liquefaction, making it possible to create a world class LNG hub at Vasiliko (and potentially other gas or energy dependent industries).

This is one of the main reasons KOGAS, the largest LNG trader in the world, ENI and TOTAL decided to invest in Cyprus. Pipelines do not offer flexibility in the selection of markets, there could be legal complexities and are subject to longer-term commercial and political risks.

EU Gas needs

• As we saw earlier, by 2025 Cyprus could be in a position to export 25 million tonnes LNG (35 bcm) per year, starting with 5 million tonnes (7 bcm) by 2020. This could rise to 35 million tonnes (50 bcm) per year if Vasiliko becomes an LNG hub for the region.

• As a result, by 2025 Cyprus and the Levantine Basin could supply 50% of the additional gas needs of the EU. Through the South-East Med Gas (SEMEG) Corridor it could form a new independent and secure supply of LNG which could contribute substantially to EU’s future energy security.

• The EU is looking for secure and independent sources for its future gas needs. Something which requires a new and independent gas corridor. This is what an LNG hub at Vasiliko can offer, at the centre of the Levantine Basin. From there LNG can be distributed to any regasification terminals in the EU.

• Although the South-East Med Gas Corridor is essential this has not yet received the backing it deserves and as Ellinas put it «We have a lot of work to do to make the case!»

• The South-East Gas Corridor that Cyprus offers is important because it can cover up to 50% of the additional gas needs of the EU by 2025.

• Given EU’s future gas needs, both the Southern Corridor (through Turkey) as well as the South East Gas Corridor will be needed.

3. For Cyprus the key milestones are:

•  Start of construction in Q1 2016 creating thousands of much needed employment opportunities.
• Delivery of natural gas to the island end of 2018 / early 2019 leading to major reductions, possible 50%, in the cost of fuel for electricity.
• Export of LNG by the end of 2019 / early 2020 producing much needed revenue and profits.
• If Cyprus pursues the development of its natural gas resources correctly, then by 2025 Vasiliko will become the LNG hub for the region – including Israel and Lebanon.
• The South-East Med Gas (SEMEG) Corridor will be of major strategic importance to Europe, firmly establishing the Levantine Basin and Cyprus within the energy and political map of the EU.
• Vasiliko will become a major centre of gas-based and energy-intensive industries, with major long term employment opportunities.

From his side Anastasios Giamourides made the following points:

Aphrodite and other recent discoveries in the East Mediterranean have given rise to a lot of optimism that Cyprus can emerge as a natural gas exporter in the coming years. This is feasible but not a given. It presupposes significant current technical/commercial uncertainties (perfectly normal at this stage) are clarified favourably before a Final Investment Decision (FID) can be reached before early 2016. These include clarification of the exact size of recoverable reserves; and the ability of Noble Energy and any partners to contain infrastructure development costs (production, pipelines, liquefaction etc.) and sign long-term sales contracts that capture high prices and other commercially appealing terms. 

If economics at Aphrodite alone do not work, then Cyprus will have to seek economies of scale with its other offshore blocks and/or with Israel, albeit this is likely to delay the commercialisation process. Furthermore, proving up commerciality in the offshore blocks that were recently licensed to Total and the ENI-KOGAS consortium under the country’s second licensing round will at any rate be necessary, if Cyprus is to export more than the 5 mmtpa currently envisaged by Noble Energy for block 12.

Importantly, any attempt to mix (real) political problems or goals relating to the Cyprus dispute with what ought to be commercial decisions aimed at monetising these resources as efficiently as possible, could end up undermining progress, which may be fully achievable on technical/commercial terms. For example, Turkish attempts to condition development of Cypriot hydrocarbons on a solution to the long-standing Cyprus dispute can result in considerable delays, whilst these political negotiations last. Meanwhile, calls for Cypriot exports via a subsea gas pipeline to Turkey are based on the (erroneous) premise that this is necessarily a commercially superior monetisation option compared to liquefaction. Preferred options need to be defined by scoping/costing of development options and market feasibility including discussions with potential customers, led by Noble Energy and other licensees/investors. 

The EU has three main reasons to take an active interest in Cyprus and help it make the most of its upstream potential as soon as feasible, and without unnecessary delays imposed by extraneous factors. First, as a means of stimulating growth and facilitating successful transition of the Cypriot economy; second, as a direct corollary of the involvement of France’s Total and Italy’s ENI in Cyprus upstream; and third, as a result of the EU’s commitment to supporting competition on the gas supply level. Support from Brussels and European capitals should thus be aimed at allowing relevant commercial decisions to be taken on the appropriate commercial (i.e. not political) levels, including licensing, exploration planning, exploration and production operations, commercialisation, and export markets. Failure to meet these objectives could impact negatively on the economic sustainability of Cyprus; market effectiveness and profitability potential of major European energy companies Total and ENI; and the EU’s own stated goals of security of supply and competitive energy markets.

From my side having convened both of the South East Mediterranean hydrocarbon seminars of this term – the first one by Deputy Energy Minister of Turkey Murat Mercan and this one by Dr Charles Ellinas, I can only conclude that both countries would stand to benefit if there was direct dialogue between them. The encouraging thing is that both speakers indicated that there was a willingness at least to exchange ideas and to explore possible cooperation.

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[1] See blog on the 22^nd of April event http://akaminara.wordpress.com/2013/05/06/turkey-and-the-eu-energy-policy-seminar-at-st-antonys/

[2] http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NG_65.pdf

[3]UNCLOS UN Convention of the Law of the Seas

Agency in the time of Structural Adjustment: Social perspectives on contemporary Greece

Dimitrios Gkintidis

The workshop “Agency in the time of Structural Adjustment: Social perspectives on contemporary Greece” took place on the 9^th of May 2013 at the European Studies Centre. The workshop was convened by Dimitrios Gkintidis in the context of the 2012/2013 A.G. Leventis Fellowship at SEESOX with the administrative support of Ms Julie Adams. Its aim was to bring together social anthropologists working on different ethnographic case studies in contemporary Greece, and at the same time to implicate a wider audience from various disciplinary backgrounds.

After the introductory remarks from Dimitrios Gkintidis (St Antony’s College, Oxford), Othon Anastasakis (St Antony’s College, director of SEESOX and the ESC, Oxford) welcomed guests and participants and emphasized the importance of a nuanced and multileveled understanding of social processes in Greece within the recent conjuncture of the debt crisis and policies of Structural Adjustment.

The first session consisted of Renee Hirschon’s (St Peter’s College, Oxford) opening speech, chaired by Kostas Skordyles (Modern Languages Department, University of Oxford). Building on a decades-long ethnographic experience in contemporary Greece, Renee Hirschon provided with an insightful overview of a series of cultural features that pervade practices and discourses in Greece. These include particular perceptions of time, personality, and autonomy. Through examples such as name days, punctuality (and the lack of it), and defiance to hierarchy, Renee Hirschon sketched a holistic account of Greek culture. This intriguing opening speech entailed a heated discussion, revolving around the class, spatial, and temporal variations of these cultural features, their dynamics within Greece or the “West”, as well as the wider questioning of the heuristic potential of holistic approaches.

The second session, titled “Collective Action and Social Agency”, consisted of the presentations of Georgios Agelopoulos (University of Macedonia) and Dimitris Dalakoglou (University of Sussex), discussed by Olga Onuch (Nuffield College, Oxford), and chaired by Carolina Kobelinsky (St Antony’s College, Oxford). Georgios Agelopoulos’s presentation focused on citizens’ initiatives in suburban areas of Thessaloniki, and namely new practices of production and exchange arising in complementarity with (or as a transformation of) protest politics. Dimitris Dalakoglou’s presentation spoke of the spatial reconfiguration of the centre of Athens, during the last 20 years, and the relevance of these changes with political and ideological processes, both on a grassroots level as well as within the field of power. Olga Onuch raised the issue of the extent to which current citizens’ initiatives in Greece differ radically from previous forms of organization (e.g. the old cooperative movement), while also pointing out the political modelling of public space in other historical conjunctures and geographical settings. A large part of the following discussion was focused on the political dynamics of these processes, both in regards to the Greek government and its fragile legitimacy among large disenfranchised parts of urban populations, as well as in regards to new emerging political powers and parties.

The third session, titled “National Imaginary, Global Realities”, had a focus on the complex interplay of local discourses, national representations, and supranational economic and political realities –that have become more than evident in the case of Greece with the direct involvement of the EU, the ECB, and the IMF in the restructuring of Greek economy and the austerity policies of “internal devaluation”. Drawing from ethnographic examples in provincial Greece, Daniel Knight (LSE) and Dimitrios Gkintidis (St Antony’s College, Oxford) spoke of the perceptions of prosperity and poverty in the regions of Trikala and Evros respectively, as well as of the symbolic points of reference through which the crisis is understood –namely a nationally mediated collective memory, but with interesting regional and class differentiations. The session was chaired by Roulla Kaminara (St Antony’s College, Oxford), while Kerem Ӧktem (St Antony's College, Oxford) took part in the panel as a discussant. His comments focused on the ways that the crisis has induced a blow to the ontological certainties of Greek nationalism, in contrast to the perceived past dominance of Greek economy; in fact, interesting comparisons were drawn during the discussion, not only between the two ethnographic case studies, but also in regards to neighbouring countries in the South Eastern European periphery –namely Turkey, which seems to be going through its own period of national self-confidence.

The fourth session of the workshop consisted of Dimitris Papanikolaou (St Cross College, Oxford) drawing on the previous presentations and discussions and outlining a set of stakes pervading the current crisis: the anxiety of modernization/westernization reframed in terms of a failure, the body and affect in the time of decaying certainties, familiar and familial metaphors of the crisis, and the disenchantment of post-national narratives. Moreover, this presentation also pointed out the ambivalent positioning of Greek Studies within the current conjuncture: from a precarious and gradually marginalized academic field during the previous two decades, the economic crisis has brought Greek Studies scholars and their work back within the centre of much attention –not only scholar. The open discussion that followed indeed made clear that the awareness of this positioning also entails specific responsibilities and roles to be assumed. If the crisis is to be thought in terms of a rupture, with both liberating and regressing prospects, the academia and its politics will soon have to make their own difficult choices.

Visit the Agency in Greece website

Serbia and regional cooperation in the Western Balkans: EU membership perspective as a tool for overcoming the past

David Madden

The Ambassador of Serbia in the UK, HE Dr Dejan Popovic, spoke on this theme at a SEESOX seminar on 6 May. The Discussant was Elizabeth Roberts, and David Madden chaired.

The Ambassador described the situation in Serbia. It was now almost 13 years since the collapse of the Milošević regime. The subsequent governments established following free and fair elections had been vocal in expressing their commitment to regional cooperation, and the shadow of disputable cooperation with the Hague Tribunal was removed in 2011 when the last two of the total of 45 Serb indictees were extradited to the ICTY. In addition there had been acts of official and explicit Serbian contrition for Srebrenica.

Serbia's War Crimes Prosecutor had carried out inquests against 397 suspects, and indicted 153 of them. 64 indictees, almost all of Serb origin, had been sentenced for war crimes: 69 were still facing trial.

Relations were excellent in the case of Macedonia and Montenegro. The only dispute with the former was about the status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, an ecclesiastic not a state issue. Relations with Croatia reflected the strong pro-European position of successive Government in Belgrade: President Nikolić and Prime Minister Dačić were expected to attend the EU accession ceremony in Zagreb on 30 June. Serbia was fully committed to the territorial integrity of BiH. Serbia’s Government had consistently discouraged separatist rhetoric, and endorsed the country’s EU aspirations. It was difficult to imagine the Western Balkans with Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia in the EU and Bosnia out of it.

Most delicate were relations with Kosovo. The dialogue between Belgrade and Priština was raised to a high level with the facilitation of Baroness Ashton. A series of meetings between the two Prime Ministers, subsequently involving Presidents, started in October 2012. The objective was the gradual normalisation of the two sides' relations, without prejudice to the two parties' positions on status, and achieving progress for both along their respective EU paths. This was achieved with the Agreement reached on 19 April 2013. The Ambassador supplied full details, including on policing and courts.

The Ambassador underlined the role of EU soft power. The perspective of better livelihood within the EU – not just through attracting additional funding (as a simplistic approach predicted) but through radical social and economic reforms as required by the acquis – had proved again to be an important incentive for all the countries in the Western Balkans. The EU – in spite of the size of its own problems – would continue to play a major role in securing the sustainability of the Stabilisation and Association Process. Such a role also needed responsible and courageous interlocutors among the Western Balkans politicians.

Elizabeth Roberts wondered whether it required those associated with hard-line positions to reach break-throughs in difficult circumstances– parallels with Nixon in China. She sought clarifications on a number of points: role of the constitutional court, timing of implementation, the position of the Church, role of the EU as a weapon of mass attraction etc.

A general discussion ensued, with many points raised and debated: including the role of Russia, of the US, of the position of the 5 EU member states who did not recognise Kosovo, access to Serbian holy sites in Kosovo etc.

A general consensus appeared to emerge: the agreement was one of historic importance; it had come about because both sides wanted it, and wanted security; and it was a welcome feather in the cap of the EU, and especially Lady Ashton. The likely long accession process for Serbia (7 years or so) would set the parameters for future developments.

Turkey and the EU Energy Policy

Androulla Kaminara

On the 23^rd of April, the Deputy Minister of Energy of Turkey, H. Murat Mercan gave a presentation on “Turkey and the European Union Energy Policy” to an audience that not only included energy specialists but also political scientists that are interested in developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. The seminar was promoted both by SEESOX and by the European Studies Centre of St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. 

Assoc. Prof. H. Murat Mercan is an industrial engineer by training and has been a founding member of the ruling  Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey as well as Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Parliament from 2007-2011.

Mr Mercan started his presentation by emphasising the very close connection between foreign policy and energy policy and that having a foreign policy background has been very useful in his current job. He presented why in his view “Europe’s energy equation is unsolvable without Turkey”. He emphasised that although Turkey is “poor in natural energy” its geographic position makes it the main southern route for most energy sources from the east to Europe.

He gave a detailed explanation on the current pipeline projects either completed or in construction. The map summarises the situation.

Turkey is aiming at playing a significant role in the axis of the developments in the global energy sector while it is “putting tremendous efforts in diversification of the supplier countries for its own energy security”. It has become an “energy corridor” and a “new and critical actor of the multi-national oil and natural gas pipeline projects and international energy arena.”

While investing heavily in pipeline projects and other infrastructure projects to the tune of 10 Billion USD annually, Turkey has recently taken the decision to “go nuclear” with 2 nuclear power plants expected to be in operation by 2023 and a third being under consideration costing an additional 40 Billion USD. The  construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power plant on the southern coast of Turkey will start in 2014, the contract having being given to the Russian company Rosatom with British Rolls Royce as a partner and the second will be near Sinop on the Black Sea coast in the north. At the same time Turkey is promoting renewable energy production, predominantly hydropower.

When addressing the second part of his presentation focusing on Turkey and the EU, Murat Mercan emphasised that he does not see the “interest” for Turkey to become a Member State although via the EU-Turkey positive agenda enhanced cooperation, it was agreed that the following five areas of cooperation will be pursued: long term energy scenarios and energy mix; market integration, cooperation, promotion of renewables and nuclear safety issues.

In several parts of the seminar Murat Mercan referred to the relations with Israel and Cyprus and repeatedly mentioned that the only “economically viable option” for Cypriot and Israeli gas to reach the European markets is via a pipeline through Turkey and that other options such as LNG should be abandoned. He also stressed the need to immediately open the Energy Chapter of the accession negotiations.

Androulla Kaminara, the discussant and the current EU Fellow at St Antony’s responded to the presentation. She responded to the presentation of the D. Minister by reminding that the EU is an important partner for Turkey for many reasons.  Over 75% of foreign direct investments into Turkey are from the EU. She also referred to the latest progress report on Turkey’s accession and in particular the chapter on energy which outlines that “some progress can be reported in the energy sector” and that “Turkey is at a moderately advanced stage of alignment”.

With respect to the general EU Energy policy objectives, she stated that energy security and energy diversification are central in the design of the energy future of the EU. In order to export all the forecasted natural gas from the Levant Basin at least 4-5 pipelines will be required. It is thus difficult to imagine that either Cyprus or Israel will choose to “put all their eggs in one basket” and built 4-5 pipelines via Turkey.

The seminar was chaired by Dr Othon Anastasakis. The discussions and the question and answer session was very interesting and lively and they focused primarily on the geopolitical aspects of the choices ahead for Turkey as well as the implications for energy policy on developments such as the PKK agreement with the Turkish government and the construction of the pipeline from the Kurdish Region of Iraq to Turkey.

Turkey and Syria

Kerem Oktem

As former Foreign Minister of Turkey and founding member of the ruling Justice and Development Party, Yasar Yakis is probably one of the most insightful commentators on Turkey’s foreign policy. Before his entry into politics in 2002, Mr Yakis went through a distinguished diplomatic career, which brought him to the most important capitals of the Arab world. Serving as counsellor in the Turkish Embassy in Damascus in the late 1970s, he represented Turkey as Ambassador in Riyadh and Cairo in the 1990s. Considering this CV, one would expect that few people would be more qualified to speak about the current relations between Turkey and Syria. And indeed, this was also the audience’s impression, which filled up the European Studies Centre for a special lunchtime lecture on April the 25th.

Mr Yakis began with a brief overview of the Syrian conflict and drew attention to Turkey’s intensive mediation efforts well into June 2011. The turning point was probably the Turkish proposal to Bashar Al Assad to remove from power his widely-feared brother Maher. For Mr Yakis, this was a ‘probably unwise move’, with which the Turkish government burned the bridges and lost all channels of communication with the regime in Damascus. While Mr Yakis acknowledged that Turkey initially showed the right reaction in siding with the oppressed people of Syria, he also stressed that the government was slow in responding to the changes in the regional security environment. While the West also supported the uprising, the US realised early on that the weapons supplied mostly by US allies Qatar and Saudia Arabia were falling into the hands of radical groups like the Jabhat-al-Nusra, which has recently declared itself as part of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Turkey continued its support to the Free Syrian Army and its associates nevertheless, which put it temporarily at odds with its Western allies, while it also led to the loss of a major land trading route to Turkey’s crucial Arab export markets. In the end, Turkey did realign with the US on Iraq, but it has now lost much of its leverage in Syria.

Considering the current stalemate between the regime and the rebels, Mr Yakis argued that both sides were aware that no outright victory was possible, and both sides felt that a negotiated settlement was necessary, but they preferred to negotiate from a position of strength. This, he suggested, is also true for the outside players, for which Syria has become the theatre of a proxy war.

Roy Allison, an Expert on Russian politics of St Antony's College’s Russian and East European Studies Centre commented on Mr Yakis’ talk by taking up the ‘regional proxy war’ argument and by detailing the position of Russia as a key example of these outside players. He remarked that the current play of affairs was reminiscent of cold war dynamics, where the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are on one side of the divide, and Russia, Iran and Syria on the other. Only that this time, the divide seems to be between an American-led ‘Sunni’ and a Russian-supported ‘Shia’ axis. He emphasized that Russia perceives the latter to be a more secular grouping, while it sees the Sunni axis as one linked to Islamist terrorism, also closer to home in its Caucasian territories and particularly in Chechnya. Dr Alison also drew attention to the hardening position of Russia in the UN Security Council vis-à-vis the idea of intervention in Syria.

Both speakers agreed that the use of chemical weapons would be a game changer and galvanise the US government into military action. Until that point, however, the proxy war in Syria will continue to claim the lives of tens of thousands, and will turn hundreds of thousands more into refugees seeking for asylum in Turkey and other neighbouring crises.

On the EU way

Othon Anastasakis

The Director of SEESOX, Dr Othon Othon Anastasakis, talks to Nike Giurlani of SIR Europe about the enlargement of the EU in the light of current developments in Europe.

Click on the link to read the interview.

Cyprus emergency: An analysis

David Madden talks to Rosie Leydon of BFBS News