The future of European security architecture

On 31 January 2025, the Eastern Mediterranean Programme at Oxford supported a dialogue on the future of European security architecture, which was hosted by the Russian and East European Studies’ (REES) Discussion Group.

The panel of speakers consisted of three renowned individuals with a multifaceted expertise on the matter: Captain Kurt Engelen (Centre for the Study of Security and Defence of the Royal Higher Institute for Defence (RHID) of Belgium; General (ret.) Riho Terras (European Parliament and former Commander of the Estonian Armed Forces); and Kyriacos Kouros. (High Commissioner of Cyprus to the United Kingdom).

Finding solutions to energy insecurity will further stimulate growth, which the most important factor in regaining confidence amongst the developing world, which has recently been damaged.

Nonetheless, the importance of thwarting Russia’s advance in Ukraine was noted, with some speakers suggesting that ‘Ukraine is not losing’, due to the immense casualty-per-mile-gained ratio Russia faces. Concurrently, two of the speakers noted the importance of citizens actively engaging in supporting Ukraine, through personal initiatives and donations, with the war currently costing each EU citizen, on average, not more than €3 per month. That said, the necessity for EU member states to start spending more on defence was raised, with some speakers noting their regret that Ireland commits a mere 0.5% on defence, even though an Irish official was appointed to head the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), with Austria only committing 0.7% of its GDP.

Elaborating on Russia as a threat to European security, it was suggested that Russia never aspired to a peaceful state-of-affairs with Europe, if security arrangements in Europe are not favourable to their terms. To substantiate this, it was noted how, shortly following his appointment as Prime Minister, in 1999, Vladimir Putin downplayed the sovereignty of the Baltic States, while, in the Munich Security Conference of 2007, he challenged Ukraine’s statehood. The violence exerted in the Second Chechen War, in 1999, as well as in Georgia, in 2008, the illegal annexation of Crimea by force, in 2014, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in 2022, indicated how Russia is willing to unilaterally use conventional military force to achieve political goals, in contravention to international law. On this note, it was noted how the best tell-tale to a political leader’s future course of action is to listen to what they suggest they will do next. Parallels were also drawn with Turkey’s behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean, which exhibits a unilateralist, hegemonic foreign policy with active occupations in Syria, Iraq, and Cyprus.

Toward the end of the discussion, the speakers raised the need to understand how other actors think about warfare, which may differ to that of Europeans and Americans. The Russian perception of war as a multidimensional conflict was shared to support the notion that Russia has ‘always been at war’ with Europe. To this end, reference was made to Russia’s warfare doctrine, as well as China’s, which do not consider war to merely entail conventional warfare. Informational warfare and other hybrid operations are, thus, an important part of Russia’s and China’s toolkit of war.

On this note, the reference to impending threats beyond Russia was noted. Apart from state-based threats, such as those arising from China and Iran, the threat of a resurgent movement of Islamic fundamentalism was noted. In general, the importance of engaging society in security and defence was raised, ahead of trying times (akin to the ‘total defence’ concept). This entails preparing for non-conventional warfare, such as informational warfare, in which authoritarian states maintain an advantage, since democracies ‘cannot lie’ but merely debunk incoming disinformation, thus limiting democracies to a reactionary strategy. In light of this, it was stressed that measures to address threats must be tailored to the threats faced, rather than political imperatives.

Responding to a question about Trump’s second administration, two of the speakers noted their low confidence in Trump, especially given the absence of competent associates, which he intentionally got rid of. That said, it was recognised that the US pivot away from Europe is a historical phenomenon, as demonstrated by their lateness in entering WWII, and, more recently, Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’. Nonetheless, cooperation with Europe remains necessary for the US, as much as Europe. On the positive end, the speakers noted that Biden’s predictability might have been costly to European and American security, while Trump’s unpredictability constitutes a possible, even if risky, deterrent to challenges external to the Euro-Atlantic bloc. Interestingly, Trump previously pushed for European energy security and is willing to support it if it benefits America in his opinion (such as through the sale of American natural gas).

by George Hajipavli (Eastern Mediterranean Programme Coordinator)