Reconceptualising the EU-member states’ relationship in the age of permanent emergency

On Wednesday 8 May, the SEESOX hosted a presentation by Stella Ladi (Queen Mary University of London) on “Coordinative Europeanisation.” Since 2008, the European Union has been engulfed in several crises. While distinct, these crises are feeding into each other and are testing the capacity and resilience of EU and member states. With the Covid-19 crisis, there has been a trend towards a new mode of “coordinative Europeanisation” in EU decision-making, altering the relationships between EU-member states in pursuit of fast policy responses.

Ladi defined coordinative Europeanisation as “a process where increased and often informal coordination between EU member states and EU institutions takes place during a crisis’ early stages in view of quickly devising policy solutions that work for everyone, thereby enhancing decision-making speed, reform ownership and policy compliance.” Coordinative Europeanisation, Ladi argued, may coexist with other pre-existing modes of Europeanisation, such as soft Europeanisation and coercive Europeanisation. At the same time, de-Europeanisation trends have also emerged.

In her research, Ladi seeks to understand the public policy agenda of the EU, asking whether the EU is managing to adequate
ly respond to global crises using existing as well as novel means. She raised three questions in particular. Firstly, in which policy areas is coordinative Europeanisation taking place? Secondly, is coordinative Europeanisation always linked to a crisis and/or an emergency? And thirdly, what kind of policy and governance solutions emerge out of these crises and how successful and long-lasting are they?Coordinative Europeanisation has the following features. In terms of rationale, it involves countries joining forces to solve a transboundary problem. It also implies the perception of a positive-sum game even in the face of re-distributional costs. Usually, coordinative Europeanisation happens in response to an emergency or major “existential crisis,” necessitating fast-paced action to reach an agreement and fast implementation thereof. The key actors in coordinative Europeanisation are the European Commission, which acts as a policy entrepreneur and broker of new, bold solutions, shared and agreed early on with the member states to facilitate implementation. In addition, member states, particularly core executives, mobilise early on to agree on these solutions.

Coordinative Europeanisation involves policy learning as well as a mix of soft and hard tools, both facilitated by ownership. The type of change it involves is mainly radical, e.g. issuing Eurobonds, fostering defence collaboration, and so on. The process leads to fast agreement on a course of action, crisis management policies with national ownership, and quick implementation. Coordinative Europeanisation has visible short-term effects in the form of activated policy responses, but long-term outcomes and their effectiveness remain unclear.

Ladi concluded that the growing appetite for coordinated solutions is linked to a growing awareness that national governments cannot tackle trans-boundary crises, and that austerity and regulation alone cannot solve the new wave of crises. Ladi asked whether coordinative Europeanisation can extend beyond emergency policy-making, and whether it can and should be institutionalised. She also asked what the experience teaches us about multilateralism more generally and what lessons can be drawn from the EU’s actions on a global level. Finally, Ladi asked under what conditions multilateralism works when facing global challenges and slow-burning crises.

Paul Copeland (Queen Mary University of London) contributed to the conversation as a discussant, agreeing with Ladi that austerity is seen as insufficient for achieving European integration. However, he raised the issue of financing: Ladi’s research shows the importance and centrality of “hard cash,” especially on the EU level, and the money has to come from somewhere. Copeland also pointed out that the heightened sense of crisis within the EU reduces the space for deliberation, despite growing agreement on the need to coordinate EU approaches to crises.

Georgios Kostakos (Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS)) brought a more global perspective to the discussion, raising the UN as a point of comparison. Taking a historical view, Kostakos pointed out that similarly to the European Commission, the role of the UN’s Secretary General has become stronger and more political than anticipated, with the Secretary General bringing topics before the UN Security Council. The UN Secretary General is also able to elevate issues to become political issues, for example climate change. Similarly to the EU, some countries have veto powers within the UN, but there are ways of going around it, for example by bringing issues before the General Assembly.

The Q&A session gave audience members the chance to exchange views with Ladi on a number of relevant issues. For example, some listeners pointed out that we should consider the impact of coordinative Europeanisation on other countries. Ladi agreed that this question is relevant, citing the example of COVAX being undermined by joint European procurement of Covid-19 vaccines. The audience also discussed whether institutionalising existing arrangements would deprive them of their informality and thus rob them of their transformative power. Ladi responded that flexibility and informality are mainly important during the first stages of the process, during which plans are made as close as possible to what governments think they can realistically implement.

by Ladislav Charouz (ESC Research Assistant)