Schengen enlargement: Are Bulgaria and Romania second-class EU Member States?

SEESOX hosted its first seminar of the Michaelmas Term on 11 October, on the theme of Schengen Enlargement and whether Bulgaria and Romania are in fact second-class EU Member States. It brought together Dragos Tudorache (Member of European Parliament), Sophie in’t Veld (Member of the European Parliament – online) and Eli Gateva (Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford), and was chaired by Jonathan Scheele (SEESOX).

Tudorache began by pointing out that the current impasse was a symptom of the problems of the Brussels decision making process. He recalled the timeline of the issue, noting that the two countries had completed all the technical work necessary to join Schengen in 2011, as originally foreseen. The first delays were provoked by Romanian backsliding on 2009/10 on judicial reforms, leading the Commission to make a link between these and Schengen enlargement, thus providing a useful alibi for certain Member States. A new President and government in 2014/15 tried hard, in discussion with the Member States concerned (France, Germany, Netherlands) to resolve the issue and at the end of 2015 the first two were ready, but the Netherlands held out, principally for domestic political reasons. This situation continued until 2022, when everything seemed to be lined up for agreement in the autumn; however, Austria then raised concerns for the first time and Netherlands was then no longer ready to move, while other Member States preferred not to push the matter.

The consequences for Romania are significant; in economic terms, a two day wait for trucks on the border costs billions and threatens any just-in-time manufacturing processes. It also creates a two-tier system at Schengen borders for citizens of another Member State. Furthermore, it strengthens support for the (new) extreme right in Romania who exploit this as “a humiliation” of the country; this could have implications in the various elections in 2024. Hopes of isolation of Austria remained, but efforts at discussion had been rebuffed.Gateva noted that Romania and Bulgaria have been treated differently from the start. Upon accession the two countries became the only member states subject to post-accession EU monitoring in the areas of judicial reform and fight against organised crime through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). The mechanism was established in 2007 and was initially envisaged to last up to three years, but it was in September 2023 when the Commission lifted the CVM monitoring. The CVM played an important role in promoting reforms, but it has also been used by some member states as a justification for repeatedly blocking the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to Schengen. The Commission has insisted that the two issues are not linked. Despite complying with the Schengen acquis since 2011 both countries have been blocked from joining and ultimately denied the economic benefits of passport free travel. Romania claimed losses of up to 2% of the GDP, Bulgarian finance minister estimated losses of around 4% of the GDP. Sofia and Bucharest have raised concerns about double standards and unfair treatment. The establishment of the Rule of Law report is a step in the right direction as it examines developments in key areas for the rule of law across all EU member states.

However, keeping Bulgaria and Romania outside the visa-free travel area – one of the ‘crown jewels’ of EU integration – has also had an impact on third country relations, where the EU found it difficult to pressure the USA to include Bulgaria and Romania in their Visa Waiver Programme while still refusing them Schengen accession. There is also long-term damage to the perception of Bulgaria and Romania as equal partners. And Schengen membership will be seen in Bulgaria as a key indicator of success for the current pro-EU coalition government.

In’t Veld had strongly opposed the positions of successive Dutch governments; indeed, she argued that she had left the D66 party partly because of its behaviour over migration and exclusion of certain Member States. The pressure on the current fragile Bulgarian government was added to by the Austrian and Dutch positions. Unanimity, and the intergovernmental system, was grinding to a halt, making objective criteria redundant and giving the Romanian and Bulgarian public the impression they had been fooled. The problem was that incentives for national leaders are not rational but respond to domestic politics – so there was little that Bulgaria or Romania can do to address the objections from Austria and the Netherlands. But there was a risk of further escalation, and of relations between Member States turning sour. Did the European Parliament need to take a stronger line?

In the subsequent Q & A, a range of issues were raised:

• The basis of the Dutch objections: it was discussed whether the issue was one of simple prejudice with no factual basis, and dated from the early 1990s, with xenophobic MPs using anti-migration language, without any real idea of what Schengen was about; and the Dutch position had been protected, before 2022, by France and Germany, but the situation had changed now, with both pushing very hard for a solution;
  
  
• Why Bulgarian and Romanian accession was different from other accessions: as there had been no similar situation in previous Schengen enlargements, it was discussed whether the link to the various reforms was specific to these two countries, due to their backsliding on reform in the late 2000s; then the migration crisis happened, and the “magic spell” of the European Council was broken, so that vetoes and blackmail became normalised;

• Whether the governments of the two countries had lobbied sufficiently: they could have done more, but the Austrian position had not been foreseen; the December 2022 European Council had been a lost opportunity;

• Whether Russia had played a spoiler role: it was felt that this had not been the case, since, in Bulgaria, Schengen accession, unlike adoption of the Euro, was not controversial and did not lend itself to exploitation by external actors;

• How Croatia had managed to join Schengen: it was argued that this reflected the fact that there was no post- accession monitoring for Croatia, so their paths diverged, leaving Bulgaria and Romania on their own; the EU’s recent introduction of an annual Rule of Law report for all Member States was a positive move to restore a measure of equality of treatment; it was also important for Austria to ensure Schengen accession for Croatia;

• Whether this situation represented a paradigm shift for future EU enlargements, rather than just a minor spat within the EU: it was argued that enlargement had now become very politicised and no longer wholly rational; it was suggested that radical EU reform was needed in key policy areas for its own sake, with or without enlargement, but the “old” Member States were not really ready to do this.

The Chair concluded that the answer to the original question was clear – Bulgaria and Romania had been treated as second class Member States.

Jonathan Scheele (SEESOX Blog Editor)