In his presentation, Karli reviewed voting trends in Turkey and outlined six reasons for the failure of the united opposition to Erdogan. He pointed out that Erdogan’s vote share has stayed more or less the same since 2014, and that the only difference in this election was that the opposition had consolidated. Despite this achievement and other factors, such as the recent earthquake and the floundering economy, the opposition has lost yet another election. On the parliamentary level, the AKP scored one of its worst results in recent history, but this was made up for by other parties in the ruling alliance. Meanwhile, the CHP received a historically low share of MPs despite staying on a similar level.
The first reason for the opposition’s failure was Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Rather than choosing a consensus candidate, the CHP insisted on fielding Kılıçdaroğlu and alienated a number of voters from the allied IYIP. Secondly, entering the parliamentary elections as a unitary alliance proved to be a failing strategy. Most of the traditional conservative Islamists who could have voted for one of the smaller parties decided not to vote for opposition candidates because they were running under the CHP banner. Furthermore, As the Kurdish party left the alliance and did not put forward a candidate, its voting share went down significantly.Thirdly, the opposition underestimated the power of government propaganda and communication. In the AKP’s nationalistic and militaristic campaign, fake news accused the opposition of allying with the PKK. Instead of a timely response, however, the opposition continued to rely on the government-friendly mainstream media. Fourthly, the opposition overestimated the impacts of the economic crisis, which has not yet reached the level at which voters change their traditional allegiances. The government has managed to stave off unemployment through its economic heterodoxy, and consumer confidence has rebounded since the beginning of the year.
Fifthly, the opposition underestimated the sociopolitical power of the governing coalition. The AKP has 12 million members and controls many foundations and associations that create jobs, environments for socialisation, and tight-knit communities. Sixthly, the opposition lacked a convincing and inspiring vision for a new Turkey. It promised to respect democracy and return to a parliamentary system, but it did not articulate a creative and positive message for the electorate.
Akkoyunlu began his presentation with two questions: How, despite two decades in power, an economic crisis, and a botched earthquake response, did Erdogan manage to win? And conversely, why have his victories been so narrow in comparison to, say, Russia’s Putin? Secondly, in what situation does the latest election leave Turkey?
In the last four elections, Erdogan received very similar results, consistently attracting around 52% of the vote. There are three reasons for Erdogan’s continued but marginal victories. For one, Erdogan has managed to cement polarisation in a way that favours the AKP. Dissatisfied voters tend to leave the AKP for its allies rather than for the opposition, and the same is true of the opposition’s voters. In part, this polarisation is driven by the media, with the government working not just through news channels but other less usual platforms like TV shows.
Furthermore, the government has been very successful in eliminating serious threats. Erdogan has imprisoned some of his opponents and appears to be set to ban others from participating in politics thanks to a politicised judiciary. Finally, Erdogan has managed to institutionalise the party state by distributing resources and rent to his allies and supporters. Indeed, the party’s power can be ascertained from the fact that it has more than three times as many members as all other parties combined. All these advantages have been consolidated by the fact that the opposition has not learned its lesson, choosing a candidate less than two months before the elections and relying on the campaign process rather than grassroots work.
As for where Turkey stands after the election, Akkoyunlu said that the silver linings are thin. Strongman politics and the party state are being entrenched in Turkey, and the presidential system will persist even if the opposition wins next time. With no incentive to return to parliamentary democracy, the system will only generate more strongman populist politics. At the same time, the CHP and IYIP face potential separation, and it is questionable whether the Kurds will continue to support the opposition alliance. Without them, the nationalists will have a difficult time in next year’s mayoral elections. Finally, there is the question of succession. Erdogan has failed to groom a successor as he cannot tolerate independent thinking, which will make any post-Erdogan transition more difficult.
The third panelist, Dimitar Bechev further contributed to the analysis of what went wrong and spoke of what might come next. Erdogan, he said, is a skilful politician and a good campaigner who has worked his way from the street to the pinnacle of power. Kılıçdaroğlu may have had an appeal as a candidate lacking strongman ambitions, but he was disadvantaged by his minority status, his associations with secularism, and his continuing losing streak in elections.
Bechev went on to say that the system is rigged in favour of the winner, with the media consistently favouring Erdogan and the opposition unable to reach swing voters. The opposition does not have the same access to resources as the AKP, which ramped up its welfare offerings, hiked up salaries in the public sector, and increased pensions. Erdogan has also promised to encourage the construction of houses through preferential loans, which has a special significance after the earthquake. Despite the shoddy infrastructure that led to many deaths, voters likely still think that the AKP is the most likely to rebuild their homes.
Last of all, the opposition has a difficult task in uniting a number of ideological currents across society. Erdogan’s nationalist and conservative base make a perfect match, while the opposition needs to unite various sectors like secularists, democrats, Kurds, AKP defectors, and anyone in between. In this process, it is difficult not to alienate people by giving too much to other members in the same coalition.
According to Bechev, there is some reason for mild optimism regarding Turkey’s economy. The naming of Mehmet Şimşek as finance minister may signal Turkey’s return to a more conventional policy on interest rates. Turkey is, after all, vulnerable to the external financial environment and dependent on financial inflows, which makes it more difficult for it to continue to pursue its economic heterodoxy. However, it is not clear whether things will change substantively given the upcoming municipal elections.
The issue of succession, Bechev continued, is central. In the next five to ten years, Selçuk Bayraktar may have a good chance to succeed Erdogan, but he will have big shoes to fill: the current president is very good at connecting to ordinary people and has a brand that carries local elections. More sombrely, personalistic regimes tend to hollow out institutions and once Erdogan is gone, the country might unravel.
In terms of foreign policy, Bechev expects a continuation of the status quo. Despite Erdogan’s anti-NATO rhetoric, the organisation will continue to be the major pillar of Turkey’s foreign policy. Sweden will also likely be admitted to the organisation. As for the Middle East, Erdogan is set to continue pursuing rapprochement with the Assad regime. He will likely renew his deals on refugees with the EU and will continue his piecemeal cooperation on energy and other areas of mutual interest between Turkey and Europe. As for the silver lining, things could have gone much worse: despite the predictions of some analysts, there has not been conflict with Greece or Cyprus. Also, Erdogan seems to have softened his rhetoric on the EU.
Anastasakis asked one question of each panelist. He asked Karli what he expected the opposition to do, and whether it was doomed to stay at 48% forever. Karli noted that the opposition still manages to fight and that 48% is a high result considering the odds are stacked against it. However, the opposition must campaign for more than just elections. Parties must become less hierarchical, and they should not be afraid to propose a more left-leaning societal project.
Anastasakis asked Akkoyunlu whether the election heralded the end of Kemalism in Turkey. Akkoyunlu responded that Ataturk is more respected than ever, and that even Erdogan has ceased to attack him. Indeed, the AKP invoked “Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,” the title “Ghazi” giving a more religious tinge to a name traditionally associated with secularism. The government has also managed to absorb voices that might be construed as rabid, fanatical Kemalist and ultra-nationalist ones. These are convinced that it is Erdogan who is fighting the PKK and Gulenists and is standing up for the nation’s interest. For the AKP, Erdogan has become an Islamic Kemalist, with both men waging successful battles against the West.
Finally, Anastasakis asked Bechev whether the issue of migration will continue to be central to relations with the European Union. Bechev responded that while migration will continue to be important, it will not be the only issue on the table. The refugee card is not as strong as some construe it to be, and the EU is able to fight back against Turkey effectively – with refugees often being caught in the middle. The EU remains Turkey’s most important export market and it will likely be involved in the country’s rebuilding following the earthquake.
Ladislav Charouz (ESC Research Assistant)
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