Anti-gender movements in Europe and the case of Turkey

On 5 March 2019, Alev Özkazanç presented her work on Anti-gender movements in Europe and the case of Turkey. The session was chaired by Othon Anastasakis.

Özkazanç began by defining anti-gender movements (AGM) and outlining their main features. AGMs started making their appearance in 2010 and gained massive support around 2012-14. Followers of these movements protest against what they call “gender ideology” i.e. what they see as an attempt by the neoliberal order to destroy family values by overpromoting the position of women against that of men. More specifically, AGMs target many aspects of gender equality policies, mostly concentrating on reproductive rights, LGBT rights and same sex marriage and sex education for children. “Gender ideology” is considered to pose a serious threat to the very fabric of society.

The phenomenon is widespread and occurs not only in Europe, but in the USA and Latin America. The movements are in most instances grassroots and locally based, and usually, but not necessarily, triggered by the Catholic Church.

While gender is the focus of AGMs, gender is used rather as a metaphor to stand for the entire progressive agenda. The narrative of anti-genderism is mostly based on the populist dichotomy of “ordinary people” against the “global powers” of transnational organisations and corporations that are held responsible for the dissemination of and imposition of the liberal world view.
Drawing on the work of some feminist academics from Poland and Hungary, Ozkazanc mentioned the three dynamics at work in the rise of illiberal regimes: familialism, securitization and the polypore state. The AGM is an umbrella movement fighting for a shift of the focus of the public discourse from the gender to the family (familialism), for the creation of a divide between, on the one hand, actors fighting for human rights - thought to be driven by foreign interests and a threat to national sovereignty – and, on the other hand, more nationalistic groups (securitization) that wish to exploit the current democratic procedures to serve the ruling elite and their allies (creation of a polypore state).

While AGMs across countries share some common features, they also display idiosyncratic characteristics. So, for example, movements in Poland and Hungary are thought to be more prominent as the academic discourse on the matter in these two countries has progressed further. One of the features that distinguishes AGMs in different countries is their supporters’ perception about the origin of the threat. In the USA, the AGM considers Jews and Soviet ideology as threatening the social fabric. In France, on the other hand, the threat is thought to come from the USA. In other countries, policies designed in Brussels constitute the risk.

One apparently distinct case in the AGM discourse is that of Turkey. As the “New Regime” itself practices along the three pillars mentioned above: securitization, familialism and a polypore state, it has in fact all but eliminated the need for a separate AGM movement. Furthermore, and in contrast to European countries, where the anti-gender debate centres on abortion, same sex marriage and sex education, the most heated topic of gender debate in Turkey revolves around the problems of rampant violence against women (particularly femicide), child abuse (particularly domestic sexual abuse) and child marriages. Ozkazanc argued that the specific content of the gender debate in Turkey has important implications for the place of gender politics in the wider Turkish politics and how and why gender could act as the Achilles heel for the new regime, rather than acting as symbolic glue.

In explaining why there have until very recently been no European style anti-gender mobilisations the basis of AGM today, with the strategic problematizing of new gender topics relating to the Civil Code (such as child custody, divorce payments) and the law to protect women against violence (Law n. 6284). She also underlined the emergence of new topics, such as opposition to the Istanbul Treaty, to gender equality projects within the state bureaucracy, and even to the use of the concept of gender itself.

In essence, at least until recently, there was no need for a grassroots movement, as the government itself had established strongholds through family and neighbourhoods, while the view of male supremacy is rooted in the country’s Islamic conservatism. In fact, AKP female party members close to Erdogan (a movement chaired by his daughter) promote “gender justice” (a term used to denote gender equality), taking a conservative but reasonable stance and believing in the complementarity of the sexes rather than male supremacy. with the exception of the Republican People’s Party, women parliamentarians from the opposition have not reacted to the AKP’s low profile stance towards the problems faced by women.

In present day Turkey, nationalistic identities and national security concerns - are at the forefront of political confrontation rather than the gender issue, despite the problems generated by male supremacy.

Given all the above, Ozkazanc argued that the AKP sought to ensure that no grassroots movement developed – even though the principles of the AGM are not alien to the government - as this would mean a loss of control, with the potential to turn out to be its Achilles heel.

Very recently, however, a first sign of the formation of such a grassroots movement has appeared, with calls for Family Friday Prayer on the 8 March 2019 (International Women’s Day) to “stop the global war on family and to end gender equality and homosexuality”, together with other AGM-focused demands. Highlighting the novelty of this discourse of male resentment and male victimisation in Turkish politics, Ozkazanc concluded that the emergence of this movement meant that we were yet to see whether gender politics would in fact turn out to be the Achilles heel for the new regime.

Daphne Nicolitsas (Visiting Academic, St Antony's College, Oxford)