Entering through the back door: China’s interests in South East Europe

Othon Anastasakis (Director of SEESOX; Senior Research Fellow, St Antony's College, Oxford)

On February 4, SEESOX hosted a seminar entitled “Entering through the back door: China’s interests in South East Europe”, with speakers John Farnell (former EU visiting fellow at St Antony’s College) and Rana Mitter (Director, China Centre in Oxford) and chaired by Othon Anastasakis (SEESOX). Farnell in his talk focused on China’s fast global rise and its inclination for long-term strategic planning as a world power. For China, South East Europe is not just a back door to Europe but very much a front door, which is proven by recent diplomatic and economic activity. South East Europe fits into the overall strategic planning of China’s two global routes which end in Europe: the Silk Road economic belt through Central Asia, and the maritime belt through the Suez Canal. China has particular interest on investment in infrastructure and energy (and less on manufacturing) and is creating special relations with some SE European states: with Serbia there is an interest in building a high speed rail from Belgrade to Budapest and there is rapid trade growth; with Greece there is ongoing investment in Piraeus which has become the 4^th busiest port in Europe, increasing interest in the port of Thessaloniki and planning for the building of an airport in Crete; and with Turkey where there has been rapid trade growth and cultural exchanges and the country is key to the Silk Road Economic belt; at the same time, there has been an uneasy rapprochement between Erdogan and China since 2012, also because Turkey itself is a rival emerging power in the region.

John Farnell added a word of caution with all these ambitious plans as there can be impediments on the way. In the recent past for instance, the 2003 China’s strategic partnership with the EU did not deliver the breakthrough that was expected; in addition, there is often increasing frustration from the EU side regarding access to Chinese markets and from the Chinese side regarding the EU’s often introvert look (constitutional matters, Eurozone crisis). In addition, there are problems with the particular EU policies on energy or transport. As for Russian-Chinese relations, Farnell added that these two countries are traditionally natural allies (with their ups and downs in the past), which share common economic and energy interests, which is why on the Ukraine crisis, China tries to be neutral and has held a position of non-interference.

Rana Mitter, gave a Chinese perspective to the debate by pointing that China is a country that has partners but no real allies in Europe. China’s most significant relationship is with the United States and this moderates its objectives in Europe. At present China is in the midst of a major diplomatic reset and has to address some difficult internal political challenges. As for South East Europe, it is important but of second and third order, given that priorities lie with the US or Russia and its adjustment in the world of international organisations and institutions, where China has a more active participation and increasing political clout, being the second biggest global economic power after the US and with a prediction to catch up with the US around 2020. Othon Anastasakis added that from a South East European perspective, growing Chinese interest offers economic leverage and a sense of a more independent negotiating power, in the context of these countries’ dependency on the European Union. This is the case with Turkey or Serbia and a current tendency in SYRIZA-led Greece. The open discussion that followed raised, among others, issues such as the unease between normative and strategic goals in the EU-Chinese relations, the complexity between the political and economic considerations, or China’s cultural links in some countries like Bulgaria.